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1508 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 65 
INCOME TAX: CORPORATIONS-Legal Expenses Incurred 
in Sale of Assets Pursuant to a Section 337 Liquidation 
Are Deductible-United States v. Mountain States 
Mixed Feed Co.* 
In 1961, the stockholders of the Mountain States Mixed Feed Co. 
voted to liquidate the corporation in such a way as to comply with the 
requirements of section 337 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 
(Code).1 That section provides that if a corporation adopts a plan of 
complete liquidation, and then within twelve months distributes all 
its assets, it will not recognize a gain or loss for income tax purposes 
from the sale or exchange of certain types of property.2 The corpora-
tion sold all of its assets and qualified for non-recognition treatment 
under section 337. It then claimed a net operating loss of $7,319.15 
on its income tax return. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
however, determined that the corporation had earned a taxable in-
come of $29,080.30, and accordingly he assessed additional income 
taxes.3 Part of the difference between the two calculations was the 
result of the Commissioner's disallowance of a claimed deduction of 
$4,000 for legal expenses relating to the sale of the corporation's assets 
in liquidation. The Commissioner reasoned that since the expenses 
were incurred in connection with a sale of assets in liquidation, they 
were not properly deductible as ordinary and necessary business ex-
• 365 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1966) [hereinafter cited as principal case]. 
1. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 337. This section, an addition to the Code in 1954, pro• 
vides that if a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation, and then within 
twelve months distributes all its assets except those necessary to meet claims, no gain 
or loss from the sale or exchange of certain property within the twelve-month period 
will be recognized by the corporation for income tax purposes. For a detailed discussion 
of the procedures involved in the various types of liquidation, see Cohen, Gelberg, 
Surrey, Tarleau 8e Warren, Corporate Liquidations Under the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1954, 55 CoLUM. L. REv. 37 (1955); MacLean, Taxation of Sales of Corporate Assets 
in the Course of Liquidation, 56 CoLuM. L. REv. 641 (1956). On the deductibility of ex-
penses incurred in liquidation, see 4A MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 
§ 25.35, at 154 (1966). 
2. Section 337(a) provides in pertinent part that if: 
(1) a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation on or after June 22, 
1954, and 
(2) within the 12-month period beginning on the date of the adoption of 
such plan, all of the assets of the corporation are distributed in complete liquida-
tion, less assets retained to meet claims, 
then no gain or loss shall be recognized to such corporation from the sale or ex-
change by it of property within such 12-month period. 
3. The facts of the case have been simplified considerably for the purposes of this 
discussion. The District Court was also presented with two other questions: the validity 
of the Commissioner's disallowance of a deduction for depreciation of assets which had 
been sold in 1961 for a price in excess of their depreciated basis; and the soundness of 
the Commissioner's conclusion that the corporation's bad debt reserve constituted in-
come to the plaintiff in 1962. Furthermore, the Commissioner contested the amount of 
taXable income reported by the corporation for the years 1958, 1959, and 1961. Mountain 
States Mixed Feed Co. v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 369, 372 (D.C. Colo. 1965). 
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penses under section 162 of the Code.4 The corporation paid the addi-
tional assessment, and then sued for a refund. The district court ruled 
in favor of the corporation.5 On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, held, 
affirmed. Legal expenses for services rendered in connection with the 
sale of assets in liquidation are expenses of carrying out the liquida-
tion, and as such may be deducted from income as ordinary and nec-
essary business expenses. 6 · 
The advantage to the corporate taxpayer in having the expenses 
in question deducted from ordinary income rather than merely used 
to offset its gain from the sale of the assets can best be illustrated by 
the following hypothetical example. Assume the taxpayer in the 
process of liquidating sells a building with a basis of $10,000 and 
receives $15,000 from the sale. Assume further that $1,000 in legal 
expenses are incurred in connection with this transaction. If the tax-
payer meets the requirements of section 337, the $5,000 gain realized 
on the sale would not be recognized for income tax purposes. In addi-
tion, under the decision of the principal case, the $1,000 in legal ex-
penses would be deductible under section 162 from the other income 
of the corporation. If the decision of the Commissioner were to pre-
vail, however, the $1,000 would not be deductible under section 162 
but would merely be taken into account when computing the gain 
from the sale of the building-($15,000 minus $10,000 minus $1,000 
equals $4,000).7 Thus, the gain on the sale of the building would be 
reduced, but since that gain is not recognized under section 337, the 
corporation would derive no tax benefit from the legal expenses. 
The result reached in the principal case has some support in pre-
vious decisions; yet, it appears to be contrary to the policy of section 
337, since in addition to the benefit of non-recognition of gain in-
tended by the Code, it also confers an unintended tax benefit-the 
ability to deduct expenses relating to non-taxable transactions from 
other income earned by the corporate taxpayer. 
It is well settled that attorney's fees, accountant's fees, appraisal 
costs, and the fees of transfer agents are deductible as ordinary and 
necessary business expenses when incurred in connection with the 
planning of a complete liquidation.8 The issue of the deductibility 
4. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162, deals with the deductibility of ordinary and neces-
sary trade and business expenses. Some deductions have been particularized by Congress 
(§§ 163-77), but most business expenses still must be justified under the more general 
language of the "ordinary and necessary" provision found in § 162. 
5. Mountain States Mixed Feed Co. v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 369, 372 (1965). 
6. Principal case at 246. . 
7. This is the basic formula employed in Federal Income Tax Form 1120, Schedule 
D, Parts I-III. The same method of computation is used in the individual income tax 
return-Federal Income Tax Form 1040, Schedule D, Part I, item 1-f. 
8. Pridemark v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965) reversing 42 T.C. 510 
(1964); Commissioner v. Wayne Coal Mining Co., 209 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1954); Arcade 
Co. v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 942 (M.D. Tenn. 1951), aff'd, 203 F.2d 230 (6th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 828 (1953); Rite-Way Prods., Inc. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 475 
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of planning expenses was first raised in Pacific Coast Biscuit Co. v. 
Commissioner,9 which held those expenses to be deductible. The 
court met the objection that liquidation expenses were not ordinary 
expenses of carrying on a trade or business by emphasizing that disso-
lution and liquidation were in the nature of a final accounting to 
both the corporate shareholders and the state of incorporation.10 In 
any business in which the management and the ownership are dis-
tinct, a periodic accounting of the operations is required and is 
usually viewed as an ordinary aspect of carrying on the business. The 
Pacific Biscuit court reasoned that the process of liquidation is simi-
lar to that of a required accounting, and thus should also be viewed 
as an ordinary incident to the running of a business. The court rec-
ognized that few corporations can be said to be perpetual; liquida-
tions due to financial failures, the retirement of officers or partners, 
or for other reasons are not unusual occurrences. Thus, the court de-
cided that the costs of the liquidation should be considered ordinary 
business expenses.11 
The Pacific Biscuit case, however, was not direct authority 
for the holding in the principal case, since Pacific was concerned 
with the expenses of planning a liquidation, whereas the princi-
pal case dealt with the expenses of putting the plan into effect 
-specifically, the costs involved in selling the assets. In only two 
other cases has a court been presented with the argument that 
was advanced by the Commissioner in the principal case. In Otto 
F. Ruprecht,12 a corporation that was engaged in the business of 
holding and renting real property sold all of the land that it pos-
sessed in pursuance of a plan of complete liquidation. The Tax Court 
disallowed the company's deduction of the legal expenses incurred in 
that sale on the ground that these expenses were not the costs of dis-
solving the corporation, but rather arose in connection with the sale 
(1949); E. C. Laster, 43 B.T.A. 159 (1940), acq., 1941-1 CuM. BULL. 7, affd, 128 F.2d 4 
(5th Cir. 1942); Pacific Biscuit Co. v. Commissioner, 32 B.T .A. 39 (1935), acq., 1954-1 
CUM. Buu.. 6. 
9. 32 B.T.A. 39 (1935), acq., 1954-1 CUM. BULL. 6. In considering whether the ex-
penses of the liquidation were "ordinary and necessary," the court relied on the test 
formulated in the leading case of Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. Ill (1933). There the 
Supreme Court held that ordinary "does not mean that the payments must be habitual 
or normal in the sense that the same taxpayer will have to make them often. A lawsuit 
affecting the safety of a business may happen once in a lifetime. The counsel fees may 
be so heavy that repetition is unlikely. None the less, the expense is an ordinary 
one •... " Id. at 114. Assuming that a taxpayer would not incur an expenditure unless 
it was required by the needs of the business, the courts have appeared hesitant to second 
guess the taxpayer's judgment as to the necessity of the expense. See 4A MERTENS, I.Aw 
OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 25.09, at 39 (1966). 
10. 32 B.T .A. at 43. 
11. There is, however, a school of thought that feels liquidation expenses are not ex-
penses of carrying on a trade or business. See, e.g., Fewell, Deductibility of Attorney's 
Fees, 8 TEXAS B.J. 72, 96 (1945). 
12. 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1[ 61125 (1961). 
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of its principal asset-land. The decision was based on the generally 
accepted principle of accounting that expenses connected with the 
sale of property are not deductible as business expenses but rather are 
taken into account in measuring the gain or loss on the sale.13 On the 
other hand, in the later case of Pridemark v. Commissioner,14 the 
Fourth Circuit reversed a Tax Court decision, which was in accord 
with Ruprecht, on the grounds that there is no meaningful distinc-
tion between the legal fees incurred in connection with the sale of 
assets in liquidation and the legal fees incurred in the planning of 
that liquidation: both qualify equally as expenses of liquidating. 
Thus, the Pridemark court held that it is permissible to deduct cer-
tain legal expenses incurred in connection with the sale of assets in 
a complete liquidation.15 
Aside from Pridemark, some support for the result reached in 
the principal case may be implied from other decisions which did not 
speak specifically to the issue of the principal case. In a. case decided 
after Ruprecht16 involving a complete liquidation, the Tax Court, 
in deciding whether certain legal expenses connected with a liquida-
tion were deductible, did not distinguish between the various pur-
poses for which those expenses were incurred.17 The few cases concern-
ing partial liquidations also seem to support the decision reached in 
the principal case.18 In Gravois Planning Mill Co. v. Commissioner,19 
a plan of partial liquidation was adopted when one of a corporation's 
officers-a major shareholder-decided to retire. The corporation 
lacked sufficient ready cash to purchase this shareholder's stock, so it 
decided to make a partial payment consisting of land and an insur-
ance policy. The corporation incurred legal expenses both in connec-
tion with the planning of the partial liquidation and in the process 
of searching and transferring title to the land. In overruling the Tax 
Court,20 the Eighth Circuit did not attempt to separate the various 
13. See Samuel C. Chapin, 12 T.C. 235, 238 (1949), afj'd, 180 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1950). 
14. 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965), reversing 42 T.C. 510 (1964). 
15. 345 F.2d at 45. 
16. Rushton v. Patterson, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 119647 (N.D. Ala. 1963). 
17. The legal expenses had been incurred in the sale of land, timber, a milling plant, 
inventories, and accounts receivable. Id. 11 9647, at p. 89,584. 
18. Farmer's Union Corp. v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1962); Gravois 
Planning Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1962); Mill's Estate, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 206 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1953), reversing 17 T.C. 910 (1951); Standard Linen 
Serv., Inc., 33 T.C. 1 (1959); Tobacco Prods. Export Corp., 18 T.C. llOO (1952). A partial 
liquidation is defined in INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, § 346. As is the case with complete 
liquidation, the loss or gain realized in the sale of certain property pursuant to a par-
tial liquidation is not recognized by the corporation. 
19. 299 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1962). 
20. The Tax Court had held that the corporation was actually undergoing reorgan-
ization and not a partial liquidation. Gravois Planning Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 29 
P-H TAX CT. MEM. 11 60122 (1960). Generally, the expenses of reorganization or re-
capitalization do not qualify under § 162 as ordinary and necessary expenses of carrying 
on a business. 299 F.2d 199,206 (8th Cir. 1962). 
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sources of the legal expenses, but held that "attorneys' fees and other 
expenses incurred in connection with a corporation's complete liqui-
dation and dissolution are deductible."21 Thus, these decisions argu-
ably evidence the willingness of the courts to allow the deduction of 
the legal expenses incurred in the sale of assets. 
Aside from pointing out the administrative difficulty of allocating 
the attorney's fees among the various services performed by the law-
yers in the process of liquidation,22 the main thrust of the taxpayer's 
argument in the principal case was that since there would have been 
no sale but for the liquidation, the sale of assets was made in carry-
ing out the liquidation; therefore, the selling expenses should be 
viewed as deductible business costs.23 On the other hand, however, 
the position taken by the Commissioner is not without merit. In the 
first place, Ruprecht has not been expressly overruled, and thus 
theoretically is still good precedent for denying the deduction. More-
over, as pointed out in Ruprecht, if the corporation had merely sold 
an asset and not liquidated, the attorney's fee incurred in connection 
with that sale would have been used as an offset against the purchase 
price to reduce the amount of gain on the sale, and not as a deduction 
from the income of the corporation. It is arguable that the same rule 
should apply when the assets are sold pursuant to a liquidation. 
Furthermore, allowing a corporation to deduct the expenses of a 
sale of assets in liquidation confers an additional benefit on the cor-
poration that is not contemplated by the non-recognition provisions 
of section 337. The purpose of section 337 was to eliminate the dou-
ble taxation that resulted when a corporation liquidated by selling 
its assets and distributing the cash received from that sale, rather than 
by distributing the assets themselves directly to the shareholders.24 
Congress decided that the method by which a corporation that is un-
21. 299 F.2d at 206. (Emphasis added.) Accord, Rite-Way Prods., Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 12 T.C. 475 (1949). 
22. Principal case at 245. 
23. In adopting the taxpayer's argument, the court said: 
[I]t is difficult to determine any reason in the authorities or in the statutes for 
any distinction as to the type or purpose of the legal work involved. It is probable 
that the attorneys could account for the time they devoted to the corporate dis• 
solution as compared with the sale of assets, but there is no reason why this 
sale of assets is not as much a .part of the liquidation as the dissolution of the 
corporation. Certainly if the costs of distribution in kind may be deducted as 
ordinary expenses, the legal cost of the sale of assets should likewise be deduct-
ible. Thus it is all a part of the liquidation-dissolution of the corporate entity. 
Principal case at 245. 
24. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945), is illustrative of the 
problems that arose prior to enactment of § 337 when the corporation was taxed on 
gains from the sale of assets pursuant to liquidation, and when the shareholders were 
also taxed when they exchanged their stock for their share of the liquidation proceeds. 
The alternative of distribution of the assets in kind is, in most cases, not only imprac-
tical, but shareholders are often hesitant or unwilling to receive assets in kind with-
out assurance of an immediate resale market. MacLean, Taxation of Sales of Assets in 
the Course of Liquidation, 56 Coum:. L. REv. 641 (1956). 
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dergoing liquidation disposes of its assets should be determined by 
business considerations rather than by a concern with tax assess-
ments.25 The solution provided by section 337 is that the corpora-
tion's gain or loss from such a sale of assets will not be recognized. 
The section contains no language to the effect that the taxpayer can 
alter the method of computing gain by labeling as a business expense 
that which would normally be used as an offset against the purchase 
price. In effect, the taxpayer is taking the costs of a particular trans-
action-a sale pursuant to a liquidation-for which Congress has 
already provided a tax benefit, and then treating those costs as a de-
duction from income derived from other sources which are wholly 
unrelated to the liquidation. 
While it may be true that the sale of assets in the principal case 
was a direct result of the liquidation, the logical extension of the 
court's position could lead to undesirable consequences. For example, 
if during a liquidation a corporation finds it necessary to spend five 
thousand dollars to renovate an asset in order to make it marketable, 
this sum would be deductible, under the reasoning of the court, since 
but for the liquidation the expense would not have been incurred. 
While such an interpretation seems unlikely, serious consideration 
should be given to amending either section 337 or section 162 to 
make clearer the question of the deductibility of various liquidation 
expenses. 
25. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1954). To illustrate the effect of 
§ 337, assume that a single-shareholder-corporation has assets with a fair market value 
of $10~,000 and that the cost of selling these assets would be $5,000. Assume further 
that the shareholder's basis in the stock is zero. If the corporation distributes its assets 
directly to the shareholder, he will realize a capital gain of $105,000, the difference be-
tween his basis in the stock and the fair market value of the property received. INT. REv. 
CODE OF 1954, § 331. The basis of the assets in the hands of the shareholder will be 
$105,000-the fair market value of the assets at the time of distribution. INT. REv. CODE 
OF 1954, § 334(a). If he then sells the property for $105,000, the $5,000 expenses incurred 
in making the sale will be offset against the total sales price. Thus his net cash receipt 
on the entire transaction would be $100,000 and, assuming a 25% tax, he would end 
up with $75,000 cash in hand. 
On the other hand, if the corporation itself sells the assets, section 337 provides that 
it will not recognize any gain or loss. After paying the expenses of the sale, the corpora-
tion, therefore, will have $100,000 to distribute to the shareholder. This $100,000 will 
be treated as capital gain to the shareholder and, again assuming a 25% tax, the share-
holder will have a net cash receipt of $75,000. 
Thus, under § 337, the shareholder's cash position is not dependent upon whether 
the corporation's assets are sold by the corporation itself or by the shareholder. How-
ever, if the $5,000 expense of the sale incurred by the corporation constitutes an 
ordinary income tax deduction (and if the $5,000 expense of sale is not deductible by 
the shareholder when he sells the assets), there is a significant tax advantage in having 
the corpor;ition effect the sale, and, consequently, tax considerations rather than 
business considerations may determine the manner of liquidation. 
